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Abstract
Recent Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives have sought to better contractually
align contractor profit with performance. Profit should incentivize efficiency in cost and
schedule and only be awarded when earned. The current research seeks evidence that
BBP has been effective in improving performance. The first part of the research
examines the trends of profit margin and cost growth both before and after the
implementation of the first BBP initiative. BBP recommended the use of incentive type
contracts over award fee contracts, where appropriate. This research found an increased
use of incentive type contracts and a reduced use of award fee contracts since BBP
commenced. Incentive contracts, in particular, showed increasing profits and decreasing
cost variance from 2001 to 2016 year, and a test for significance shows that contracts
with reductions of cost growth corresponded to higher profit margins. Macroeconomic
factors seem to have played a minimal role, suggesting the trends correspond to the
changing business environment and practices which government reform initiatives have
sought to institute. The research was unable to link BBP initiatives to the improving
relationship between performance and profit with complete certainty, finding instead that
the trend improved throughout the time period studied.
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AN ANALYSIS OF PROFIT MARGIN IN RELATION TO THE BETTER
BUYING POWER INITIATIVE
I. Introduction
General Issue
Department of Defense (DoD) contracts have frequently experienced budget and
schedule growth (Arena et al., 2006; Drezner et al., 1993; Drezner & Smith, 1990). In an
effort to improve performance, the DoD has initiated numerous improvements to policy.
However, many of these initiatives have resulted in little to no improvements of the
acquisition process (Ritschel, 2011; Hanks et al., 2005; Lorell & Graser, 2001).
Recent acquisition initiatives in the DoD have sought to better contractually align
contractor profit with performance. Profit should more strictly incentivize adherence to
cost and schedule estimates (BBP, 2015). The current research looks to examine recent
policy shifts within the acquisition community. Specifically, have the Better Buying
Power initiatives met their intended goals of reducing cost growth by better aligning
profit to performance?
Better Buying Power currently has three iterations which are referred to as BBP
1.0 (2010), BBP 2.0 (2013), and BBP 3.0 (2015). The overarching goal of all of the BBP
initiatives is to “obtain greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending through
leadership emphasis on cost control, streamlined processes, reduced bureaucracy,
productivity, innovation, competition, the acquisition of contracted services, and
workforce capabilities” (OUSD(AT&L), 2016). In particular, and the thing that
motivates the current study, is that there was an emphasis placed on the utilization of
fixed price incentive firm (FPIF) contracts. In addition, the BBP guidance required a
1

justification of contract type be included for each proposed contract before negotiations
concluded. BBP 2.0 was initiated in 2013 and focused on similar areas as BBP 1.0 and
added an extra emphasis on improving the tradecraft and professionalism of the
acquisition workforce. BBP 2.0 also clarified language from BBP 1.0 regarding the use
of FPIF contracts. The updated guidance stated that the emphasis should be on “the use
of the appropriate contract vehicle for the product or services being acquired” as no one
contact type fits every scenario (BBP, 2013). The third and most recent BBP initiative
was in 2015. It continues to focus on the aforementioned areas as well as an additional
focus on innovation, technical expertise, and quality of products (OUSD(AT&L), 2016).
The current study is interested in the impact of the increased focus on incentive-based
contracts.
Research Objectives
In order to examine the effectiveness of the Better Buying Power initiatives, this
research observes both profit margin and cost growth over time. There have been
numerous articles on each topic independently (GAO, 2017; GAO, 2009; Arnold et al.,
2008; GAO, 2005; Rogerson, 1992) but very little research has tied the topics together
(Frazier et al., 2001; GAO, 1987). Moreover, the results have been conflicting. For
example, Frazier et al. (2001) found that the variable application of contractor share
ratios is positively related to profit. Arnold et al. (2008) looked into profit policies as a
method to improve contract outcomes and found that the use of policy and incentives to
improve performance is not always practical. The conflicting reports suggest that there
are other variables that are creating a complex environment in which profit and
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performance are not easily aligned. Lastly, the Acquisition Policy Analysis Center
(APAC) within OUSD AT&L examined cost growth in 2016 and found reductions
attributable to BBP. The APAC study is a motivator for the current research which looks
to validate the finding of reduced cost growth and link that finding back to any trends in
profit margins.
The research questions for this analysis are as follows:
1. What trends of profit margin and cost growth are observed over time?
2. Does the relationship between profit margin and cost growth, relative to
BBP’s initiation in 2010, change in such a way that would lead one to
identify an independent effect from other changes within the DoD
environment?
3. To what degree can we attribute changes in profit and performance to the
larger economy, program aspects, and overall policy?
Scope and Methodology
The current study looks at Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) contracts
that have both a final Cost Data Summary Report (CDSR) and earned value management
(EVM) reporting. Contingency tables are used to test the dependency between profit and
performance and examine how the relationship between these two variables may have
changed since 2010. Non-parametric tests and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
are employed to identify other variables that correlate with the observed trends.
Particular attention is given to 2010 as a change point in the relationship between profit
and performance as that was the year in which BBP originated.
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The literature has claimed that many years of initiatives have had little to no
improvements in the DoD acquisition community (Smirnoff & Hicks, 2008). The current
study theorizes that BBP may be different, proving effective by way of the shift from
subjective to objectively focused incentives. The shift away from using subjective
criterion may establish a “credible commitment” both binding personnel to the desired
performance-profit relationship and signaling to the contractor that the DoD is willing to
take more aggressive actions if performance is not in line with expectations.
It is possible that any positive changes that the acquisition community is
experiencing has nothing to do with acquisition reform. Instead, it could be due to
improvements in the overall economic environment of the United States or contractors,
independently, becoming more efficient. Therefore, other factors such as economic and
environmental changes must also be analyzed in order to understand how such a pattern
has become evident.
Summary
Chapter 2 presents economic theory and past research on acquisition reform that
provide the framework for the methodology used in Chapter 3. The research data is
introduced in Chapter 3 along with the statistical tests that will be used to analyze the
effect of Better Buying Power in the next chapter. The statistical analysis is performed in
Chapter 4 and the results are validated to determine if Better Buying Power has been
successful. Lastly, the research is concluded in Chapter 5 and follow-on research is
recommended.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
The field of economics provides multiple theories that help us predict when a
policy may and may not have an impact. The specialized field of public choice within
economics cautions that outcomes may be different than what is advertised. Game
theory, on the other hand, provides strategies that may overcome weaknesses of
government follow through. It is the game theory perspective which suggests the
potential of BBP to have had a positive impact.
Acquisition Reform
The DoD’s acquisition system has consistently faced cost overruns, schedule
delays, and poor contract performance. United States lawmakers have operated with a
mindset that more legislation is needed in order to solve acquisition system shortfalls. As
a result, there have been over 50 acquisition reforms and initiatives since 1971 (Ritschel,
2011).
There is general agreement (Ritschel, 2011; Smirnoff & Hicks, 2008) that the
following four initiatives or reforms were among the “most important” to exist prior to
2008: the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982, the Packard Commission of 1986, the Defense
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1990 and the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. Additionally, Ritschel contends that the Weapon
System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 is also among the “most important”
reforms (Ritschel, 2011). Lastly and most recently, Better Buying Power (BBP)
initiatives were implemented starting in 2010 by the Office of the Under Secretary of
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Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)). Initial reviews
from AT&L itself has suggested BBP has made a difference. But the existence of
extensive literature concluding that these prior initiatives were important but largely
ineffective (in terms of controlling cost growth), puts into perspective the need for an
independent review.
The Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 was originally introduced in the 1982 Defense
Authorization Act and was aimed at reducing cost growth in weapon system acquisitions.
The act required that programs experiencing 25% or more cost growth from the original
estimate had to be reported to Congress and were subject to termination. This act was,
ultimately, an increase in oversight.
Four years later in 1986, the Packard Commission was established in an effort
address cost growth, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls in the weapon system
procurement process. “The primary conclusion of the Packard Commission was that
defense acquisition was unacceptably inefficient. Specifically, major weapons systems
cost too much, take too long to field and by the time they are fielded incorporate obsolete
technology” (Nordwall, 1987, p. 80). The result of the Packard Commission was a
streamlined acquisition process, increased testing and prototyping, adjusting the
organization culture of the acquisition community, improved planning requirements, and
lastly, the adoption of the competitive firm model, when appropriate (Searle, 1997).
In 1990, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) was
introduced. This act was focused on personnel who manage and implement the defense
acquisition programs and how these individuals could improve their operations. A few of
the changes implemented by this act were the establishment of an Acquisition Corps,
6

mandatory training and education requirements, the identification and designation of
“critical” acquisition positions, and guidelines for choosing between civilian and military
program managers. This act was largely human capital related.
The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 was one result of the
National Performance Review (NPR) that occurred under the Clinton campaign. The
overall goal was to alleviate parts of the acquisition process that were considered to be
burdensome and complex. This act helped to streamline acquisition processes through
changes such as the elimination of paperwork, allowing micro purchases, and requiring
less information from defense contractors (Ritschel, 2011).
The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 is one of the
more recent major acquisition reform acts. This act called for both structural and
organizational changes. WSARA initially required cost estimators to submit estimates at
the 80% confidence level and required justification be submitted to Cost Assessment and
Program Evaluation (CAPE) when lower confidence levels were utilized. The mandate
for 80% confidence was later changed to require “high degree of confidence that the
program can be completed without the need for significant adjustment to program
budgets” (CAPE, 2017).
Berteau et al. (2010) presented seven key initiatives of WSARA that aided in
structural change. Each initiative’s specific focus can be categorized further as either
oversight or acquisition process related.
•

Oversight
o A more stringent set of regulations on organizational conflicts of interest
o Revised processes for reporting critical cost growth
7

o Increased Congressional oversight through heightened reporting
requirements
•

Acquisition Processes
o Increased competition throughout the acquisition process
o Improved requirements formulation processes
o Improved cost estimation processes
o Revised Milestone A and B certification processes

To assist with the organizational changes needed, the following four positions were
created:
•

Director of Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation (DCAPE)

•

Director, Development Test & Evaluation (DT&E)

•

Director, Systems Engineering (SE)

•

Director for Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses (PARCA)
Previous acquisition reforms have each had their own agenda but many have

shared some of the same goals such as improving cost growth. One key thing that most
of these previous reforms have had in common is that they did not account for human
tendencies. They treated the acquisition process as a machine with everyone acting in the
same manner. This is where BBP may prove to be different.
Better Buying Power began in 2010 and has goal to “obtain greater efficiency and
productivity in defense spending through leadership emphasis on cost control,
streamlined processes, reduced bureaucracy, productivity, innovation, competition, the
acquisition of contracted services, and workforce capabilities” (OUSD(AT&L), 2016).
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BBP 1.0 (2010) called for the acquisition community to do more without more and the
five key focus areas are as follows:
•

Target Affordability and Control Cost Growth

•

Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry

•

Promote Real Competition

•

Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services

•

Reduce Non-Productive Processes and Bureaucracy
BBP 2.0 was initiated in 2013 and focused on similar areas as BBP 1.0. It added

an extra emphasis on improving the tradecraft and professionalism of the acquisition
workforce. The third and most recent BBP initiative was in 2015. It continues to focus
on the above-mentioned areas as well as an additional focus on innovation, technical
expertise, and quality of products (OUSD(AT&L), 2016).
A consistent theme in the multiple acquisition reform acts is managing cost
growth, schedule delays, and subpar performance. Ritschel (2011) proposed that the
“solutions” presented by all the different reforms (excluding BBP) revolved around
internal bureaucracy instead of focusing on the broader institutional construct made up of
the executive branch, legislative branch, bureaucracy, and the defense industry.
Additionally, Ritschel argues that the political-economy interactions (public choice, game
theory, etc.) are not being accounted for (Ritschel, 2011).
Others have also studied cost growth relative to the effectiveness of acquisition
reform. Drezner et al (1993) examined 197 contracts from 1960-1990 and found that cost
growth consistently remained around 20% despite the many reforms during those years.
In 1997, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) researched 33 of the 63 programs
9

reporting an acquisition reform cost reduction. Their study found that the total
acquisition cost of these programs increased by an average of 2% which suggests that the
cost savings from acquisition reform were being offset by cost increases elsewhere in the
program (GAO, 1997). Other researchers such as Biery (1992), Lorell and Grasner
(2001), and Hanks et al (2005) all come to the same conclusion that reforms are not
resulting in significant acquisition process improvement.
Similarly, other researchers have focused their research to analyzing cost growth
with respect to single acquisition reform initiatives. Ritschel (2011) performed an in
depth analysis on the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 as there was little research available at
that time. His conclusion was that the threat of program termination was rarely enforced
and the act is more of a monitoring program. He called for policy makers to enforce
stricter punishments upon bureaucracy and defense industry for breaches. Searle (1997),
Christensen et al. (1999), and Smirnoff and Hicks (2008) looked at cost growth and the
Packard Commission. These researchers have judged the effectiveness of the Packard
Commission as having mixed results. The predominant finding being that this initiative
did not improve cost growth. Snider (1996), Garcia et al (1997), and Choi (2009) all
concluded that DAWIA has enhanced the quality of the acquisition workforce. On the
contrary, Smirnoff and Hicks (2008) found that DAWIA actually increased cost growth.
Holbrook (2003), Abate (2004), and Phillips (2004) all examined the effect of FASA on
cost performance. None of the researchers found improvements to cost performance after
the implementation of FASA. Smirnoff and Hicks (2008) analyzed FASA and cost
performance as well. Their results did find that cost growth declined for production
contracts; however, R&D contracts showed no improvements. These results do not
10

signal that the reforms were not needed or that they were complete failures. However,
the common agreement among the researchers when analyzing specific acquisition
reform initiatives is that cost growth is not being affected.
The Better Buying Power initiatives (2010, 2013, 2015) have made efforts to
improve efficiency and productivity while controlling costs in the DOD acquisition
system. BBP has called for the DOD to align profitability more tightly with Department
goals. The defense industry is motivated by profit. Higher profits should be reserved for
better performance while lower profits for poorer performance (OUSD AT&L, 2014).
Another important emphasis of BBP was the use of incentive type contracts. The 2014
annual report on the defense acquisition system found that Cost Plus Incentive Fee
(CPIF) and Fixed Price Incentive Fee (FPIF) contracts were “highly correlated” with
better cost and schedule performance. Incentive based contracts share the impact of
overruns and underruns between the government and the contractor. This report did not
mandate the use of incentive contracts but it “reinforced our (the DoD) preference for
these types of contracts when they are appropriate” (BBP 3.0, 2015).
How has this latest policy reform faired? In terms of cost growth, the
Acquisition Policy Analysis Center (APAC) analyzed the annual growth of contract costs
in 2016 for MDAPs in the development and early production stages. Part of this study
was in response to BBP 3.0’s instruction for the APAC to “track and analyze the use of
various contract types and incentives to determine if additional measures can be taken to
further improve cost and schedule performance. APAC will report the results of its
analysis annually to the USD(AT&L)” (BBP 3.0, 2015).
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The APAC research found three factors affecting contract growth. First, contract
growth tends to follow the defense budget: higher budget years corresponds to higher
cost growth. Second, the APAC tied two different reform eras to reductions in cost
growth. The first was the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the second was the BBP era. The
study used “standard statistical modeling techniques to identify statistically significant
factors that are likely causes of growth”. APAC’s results attributed a 1% cost growth
reduction to Goldwater-Nichols and a 2% cost growth reduction to BBP. The researchers
did note that it is “difficult to trace changes to individual policy changes”. Lastly, the
APAC study found a constant base growth of approximately 5% in their model from
1981-2015 (all other things equal) which indicates there were “remaining uncertainties,
risks, and investments” that had not been accounted for (Davis & Anton, 2016).
In terms of profit, there have been several research articles but certainly less
attention throughout the era of policy reforms. The GAO analyzed the DOD’s use of
monetary incentives (profit or fee) on multiple occasions (2005, 2009, 2017). Rogerson
(1992) and Arnold et al. (2008) have both looked into profit policies as a method to
improve contract outcomes and both had different conclusions as to the theoretical value
of such policies. A clear picture cannot be drawn from these studies, thus necessitating
the current study.
The Rogerson (1992) research was primarily theoretical in nature but was able to
show that incentives are important to innovation. In other words, profit is a driving force
in a contractor’s performance. However, he also states that performance is difficult to
judge. The current research looks to expound on Rogerson’s study and link performance,
in the form of cost growth, back to the profit received by the contractor. Profit may be an
12

incentive that improves performance but profit policy and performance must be
effectively aligned as to not reward poor performance. This is what the current research
looks to do that the prior research was not able to do.
Other studies have given reasons to doubt that contract policy can affect change.
The IDA analysis by Arnold et al. (2008) analysis examined whether or not profit policy
and contract incentives were able to improve defense contract outcomes. This research
was started after the USD AT&L issued cost guidance in 2007 that stated “contract
finance and profit policies drive desired results”. IDA’s analysis found “that there is not
a realistic prospect of using the incentive tools permitted by DFARS to greatly improve
the average performance, schedule, and cost outcomes the Defense Department obtains”
(Arnold et al., 2008). Two of the key findings that resulted in this outcome were related
to the contract type and associated risk as well as the phase of the contract. First, IDA’s
research affirmed the findings of past research (Cross, 1966; Fischer, 1968; Frazier et al.,
2001) where contracts with an award or incentive fee construct have less cost growth than
those not containing them. While this seems promising, IDA does direct increased usage
of these contract types. They recognize that contract types are based on risk and that
contractors cannot be forced to take on more or less risk. If this were the case then
contractors would simply offset the added risk with a higher target cost during
negotiations. Ultimately, the researchers believe that if mandatory use of these contract
types were implemented then “the net result could be a contract that experiences less cost
growth but with a cost to the Defense Department that is the same or even greater”
(Arnold et al., 2008). Second, firms expect to receive large profits during the production
phase. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) does impose a limit on profit; however, the
13

limit is for cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts. In order to obtain these larger profits,
firms must first be chosen to develop a system. This chance at higher profit during
production is seen as an incentive during the development stages. Bids are often
submitted with a strategy across multiple phases in a process often referred to as “buying
in” (Christiansen and Gordon, 1998). Such interdependencies between contracts suggest
that policy changes may be effective in controlling costs for one phase but have the
opposite effect on another phase. Consequently, the use of policy and incentives to
improve defense contract outcomes is not always possible (Arnold et al., 2008).
Public Choice
The theory of public choice is valuable for understanding the form and application
of law and policy. This theory may be able to explain some of the decision making that
occurs within the acquisition community. The public choice theory can be linked back to
economists such as Kenneth Arrow, Duncan Black, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock,
Anthony Downs, William Niskanen, Mancur Olson, and William Riker. However, the
theory began to receive much more attention when James Buchanan won the Nobel Prize
in Economics in 1986 (Shaw, n.d.). Public choice utilizes economic theories and
methods in analyzing political behavior (Shughart II, n.d.). Buchanan claims that public
choice is meant to be an “application and extension of economic theory to the realm of
political or governmental choices” (Buchanan, 1978, p. 39).
Public choice must be distinguished from public interest. Public interest thinking
presumes good faith, responsibility, and technical expertise of agents. The military
weapon system acquisition process is assumed to be both technically and economically
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efficient while providing goods at the least cost to society. Political leaders and their
agents act selflessly and efficiently for the best interest of society (Tullock et al., 2002).
But there is both popular and academic writing revealing a certain skepticism of
such idealized government performance. Recent popular views of government
accountability identify a litany of causes for cost growth. Research into the causes of
cost growth are a ubiquitous tale of bad management (Chaplain et al., 2006; Paltrow,
2013).
Public choice assumes that people act according to their own self-interest.
Alternatively, public interest assumes public servants are carrying out the best interest of
the population in which they serve and that all self-interest is ignored. Buchanan
describes it as comparing “saints” to “sinners” (Buchanan, 1979, p. 49). As a matter of
principle, public choice treats the individual as the primary unit of analysis (Shughart II,
n.d.). Public choice demands we consider government to be agents of real flesh and
blood, fallible, and self-serving to some degree.
Ritschel (2011) provided evidence for the superiority of public choice to public
interest for understanding the DoD. “The process of military weapon systems
acquisitions is dominated by political and not by economic considerations.” He finds in
his survey that the acquisition framework prior to 2011 “delivers a non-optimal allocation
of resources where military weapon systems have an inefficiently high average cost and
exacerbated cost variance due primarily to political influence.” Ritschel’s analysis
concluded that the acquisition community needs to adapt in order “to incorporate a
broader political-economic construct” as decisions cannot be made efficiently in a
“political vacuum” (Ritschel, 2011).
15

If public choice has accurately described the nature of the political and public
agents, to the complexity of the military acquisition system and the amount of
bureaucracy involved, it is nearly impossible for officials to act without any self-interest.
The public interest way of thinking is not the best model or set of assumptions for
military acquisitions. Political factors can have a negative influence on contract
performance, and policy may filter poorly through the system resulting in negligible
improvements.
Game Theory
Numerous game theory models have reach similar conclusions. Some lessons of
game theory, nonetheless, suggest ways policy change may have an impact. A review
will serve to produce a hypothesis. The concept of game theory has been around since
before 1850; however, formal game theory was fielded in 1944 with the publishing of
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
and more recently by Thomas Schelling and Herbert Gintis in social-evolutionary
modeling. Today everything from parenting to soccer has been analyzed through game
theory and was popularized in the movie, A Beautiful Mind, about John Nash who won
Nobel Prize for his work.
Game theory is the study of conflict and cooperation and is applied when multiple
agents have interdependent decisions to make. Each decision has an associated payoff.
One would assume that each agent is going to act in such a way to receive the highest
payoff. Turocy and von Stengel (2001) describe the goal of game theory as a method to
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“provide a language to formulate, structure, analyze, and understand strategic scenarios”
(Turocy & von Stengel, 2001).
There have been multiple studies involving game theory and acquisition processes
such as Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), Gardener & Moffat (2008), and Ritschel (2011).
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) analyzed cost overruns and delays of infrastructure projects in the
public sector using what he called a “megaprojects paradox”. The paradox is that there is
a growing number of large projects being undertaken while a large majority of the
projects are experiencing poor performance. Why are these projects still being started
when past performance shows a high likelihood that the promised performance will not
be delivered? For example, the Channel tunnel linked U.K. and France. It promised
economic growth in the planning stage but it ultimately faced 80% cost overruns,
financing costs 140% higher than projected, and revenues that were less than 50% of the
projected amount. The poor performance resulted in a decline of the French and United
Kingdom economies rather than the growth that was promised in planning. One of the
reasons that Flyvbjerg gives for poor performance is “project promoters often avoid and
violate established practices of good governance, transparency and participation in
political and administrative decision making, either out of ignorance or because they see
such practices as counterproductive to getting projects started” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).
The issue then becomes one of determining if the poor contract performance is the fault
of the contractor or the fault of project managers promising unrealistic outcomes in order
to get their projects started. If the project managers are making unrealistic claims then
that also supports the public choice theory as they are acting in self-interest instead of
public interest.
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Gardener and Moffat (2008) present game theory as a theoretical structure to
understand the United Kingdom’s defense market. As with most highly technical,
innovative projects, risk and uncertainty are prevalent. The researchers identified a
“Conspiracy of Optimism” as the source of poor performance in acquisition programs.
As in the typical example of game theory’s Prisoner’s Dilemma, multiple parties are
exploiting the acquisition situation for short-term gain. The game theory in this analysis
was between the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Industry with a choice to go with a
realistic strategy or an optimistic strategy for a project’s estimate of performance, time,
and cost. There were three main factors that influenced each player’s decision for the
cost estimate. First, the desire of MOD in having the project approved to move forward
in the acquisition process was a factor. The second factor was the desire by the Industry
(individual companies) to out compete their rivals and be selected as contractor. Lastly,
both the MOD and Industry desired a high enough priority on the program so that there
was no concern for the program being cancelled post-bidding (Gardener & Moffat, 2008).
Table 1 reflects how the factors discussed previously explain the perceived payoffs to the two players. The results shown in the table reflect that it is in both player’s
best interest to choose an optimistic stategy as the other alternatives have potential
unfavorable outcomes. For example, if the Ministry of Defense chose a realistic
budgeting strategy then they face a reduced chance of getting the project funded and the
perception of value-for-money (VFM) is also reduced. For Industry, if the winning bid is
based off a realistic budget and MOD has budgeted optimistically, then the project is now
under-funded and now has immediate concerns for the project’s future (Gardener &
Moffat, 2008). In the system that Moffat and Gardener have presented, the key factor is
18

uncertainty. The acquisition system is full of uncertainties and is vulnerable to the
“Invasion of Optimism”. In order to ensure realistic strategies, human characteristics and
tendencies must be controlled for (Gardener & Moffat, 2008).
Table 1 - Perceived Pay-Offs to MOD and Industry

Industry bids optimistically

MOD budgets optimistically
MOD
Easy entry into equipment plan (EP) (+)
Favorable value-for-money (VFM) (+)
Industry
Easy entry into EP (+)
Stay in EP (+)

Industry bids realistically

MOD budgets realistically
MOD
Difficult entry into EP (-)
Bad VFM pre-bid (-)
Good VFM post-bid (+)

MOD
Easy entry into EP (+)
Project faces cancellation (-)

Industry
Difficult entry into EP (-)
Stay in EP (+)
MOD
Difficult entry into EP (-)
Bad VFM (-)

Industry
Easy entry into EP (+)
Stay in EP (+)
Project faces cancellation (-)

Industry
Difficult entry into EP (-)
Stay in EP (+)
Low risk of cancellation (+)

Source: Modified from (Gardener & Moffat, 2008)

Ritschel (2011) investigated whether game theory could be used to explain cost
variance in military weapon system contracts. The measure of cost variance used in his
analyses was based off the Defense Acquisition University’s (DAU) earned value
management gold card. Cost variance (CV) consists of subtracting the actual cost of
work performed (ACWP) from the budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP).
The program’s cost estimate is affected by the players who make up an Integrated
Product Team (IPT). The individual in charge is the Program Manager (PM) and has the
overarching goal of providing the requested capability to the requestor. Other members
of the IPT have different top priorities. The engineer may prioritize the best technical
solution, the logistics personnel may care about maintainability, budget personnel may be
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focused only on the funding aspect, and the cost estimators may wish to constrain the
total program cost. The cost estimator formulates an estimate based off the inputs
provided by the IPT.
The Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009 initially
required cost estimates to be submitted with a confidence level of 80% with mandatory
reporting when a lesser confidence level was used (Public Law 111-23, 2009). This 80%
requirement was later changed (Public Law 114-328, 2016) as few projects were being
submitted at the required 80% level. Estimates were submitted closer to the 50%
confidence level as reported by the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
office. The lower confidence reporting was the result of the PM facing the difficult task
of determining an appropriate cost estimate that minimizes the chance of cost-overruns
but also still makes the program competitive for funding in the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) (Ritschel, 2011).
Ritschel’s analysis presented Table 2 to show three different scenarios of game
theory where the DOD has to choose whether to submit a high or low confidence budget
estimate and Congress has to decide whether they are going to fund the project. Each
scenario used Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) where the equilibria was
determined by probabilities assigned to each payoff in the matrix using a specified
system of equations. The MSNE results are reflected in Table 3. The results of the
analyses of the three scenarios is that scenario 3 is the optimal choice. This scenario calls
for the DOD to submit a low confidence estimate 80% of the time as it has the highest
payoff to the DOD and for Congress to fund the project 80% of time as not funding
resulted in a negative payoff. Other research by Arena et al. (2008), GAO (2009), and
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Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project (DAPA, 2005) supports the claim
that low confidence estimates are routinely utilized.
Table 2 - Game Theory

Source: Ritschel, 2011

Table 3 - MSNE

Source: Ritschel, 2011

The Flyvbjerg (2003), Gardener & Moffat (2008), and Ritschel (2011) analyses
provide support that game theory may factor into cost variance in the DOD acquisition
system. Flyvbjerg claims that the PMs are submitting unrealistic estimates in order to get
projects funded. This claim is supported by the consistently high cost variance present in
the 3 projects he analyzed through case studies. Moffat & Gardener presented similar
analyses using the UK’s Ministry of Defense budgeting decision and the industries
bidding decision. In their scenario, there is a dominant strategy that results in the best
outcome for both parties; however, this outcome is not necessarily the outcome with the
lowest cost. Ritschel presents a scenario where there is no dominant strategy in which
the DoD has to decide whether or not to use low or high confidence level in their cost
estimate and Congress has to decide to fund or not fund. The acquisition system is
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complex, there are many players, and players are known to make decisions based off of
political factors.
Disconnects between policy intentions, good practices, and actual follow-through
would suggest that the DoD is going submit a cost estimate that falls around the 50%
confidence level as the goal is to get the project funded. Such a practice means there is a
high likelihood of overruns. In such an environment, it may be incumbent to take policy
action which can more strictly reduce the potential of cost growth, or contractually
preclude the growth we leave ourselves open to. Better Buying Power seems to have
taken such actions.
One method of controlling costs when there is uncertainty in the program’s
estimate is better aligning a contractor’s incentive to their performance which is the goal
of the Better Buying Power initiatives. In order for this happen, the DoD must ensure
that they establish a “credible commitment” to this behavior so that the new policies are
taken seriously.
The problem that a series of failed policy initiatives creates is a mutual lack of
faith or follow through. The signals of seriousness and competency are lost. In
Ritschell’s outcome, there is no dominant strategy. The game becomes a coordination or
brinkmanship game between the DoD and Congress in which each party is speculating
how the other might act and responds respectively. There is great uncertainty. A
coordination game is one in which multiple Nash equilibria exist. Schecter and Gintis
(2016) present examples of a coordination game. Table 4 reflects a dilemma where a
man wants to attend a wrestling event while a woman wants to attend a concert.
However, each prefers the company of the other versus attending their preferred event
22

alone as reflected by the two Nash equilibria. In this example, it is in each player best
interest to coordinate their decisions as to ensure they both receive some positive utility
(Schecter & Gintis, 2016). But the outcome is entirely unpredictable.
A second example is presented as a game of chicken (Table 5). It provides insight
into how to resolve a coordination game. Two teens are driving toward each other and a
head-on collision is imminent. Each teen wants to bolster their reputation by driving
straight. However, if they both drive straight then they are both injured. Therefore, the
only way to “win” would be to drive straight while your opponent swerves. There’s no
way to guarantee that your opponent is going to swerve so some may attempt to develop
a reputation for being “crazy” and state they are going straight no matter what and that
they don’t care if they are injured (Schecter & Gintis, 2016). Credible commitment can
more confidently resolve such uncertain speculation by signaling a certain path of action
by one player. In this case it would be the “crazy” teenager signaling that they are going
straight no matter what. Credible commitment states that when faced with a threat in a
conflict situation, the threat has to be credible in order to be effective (Schelling, 1980).
Table 4 - Battle of the Sexes
Woman

Concert

Man
Wrestling

Concert

(2, 1)

(0, 0)

Wrestling

(0, 0)

(1, 2)

Source: Modified from Schecter & Gintis, 2016

Table 5 – Chicken

Teen 1

Teen 2
Straight Swerve

Straight

(-2, -2)

(1, -1)

Swerve

(-1, 1)

(0, 0)

Source: Modified from Schecter & Gintis, 2016
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Suppose that the DOD is willing to give a contractor reasonable profit in
exchange for contract performance that meets an established criterion. Both parties have
full knowledge of the outcome as long as they both fulfill their contractual obligations.
However, if the contractor believes that the government is going to pay them reasonable
profit regardless of their performance level based off of historical information then there
is no credible commitment and the contractor has no real incentive to perform their best.
Historically, this has been the case in the DoD as reported by the Government
Accountability Office’s (GAO) research in 2005, 2009, and 2017. Their 2005 research
found that the DoD paid billions in award and incentive fees regardless of acquisition
outcomes; the 2009 research found initiatives to cure the findings from 2005 were having
mixed results as they were not being consistently applied. History undermines each new
effort as weakness is presumed. The 2017 report found that the DoD did appear to be
better allocating award and incentives based on established criteria; however, the GAO
recommended better record keeping on incentive outcomes in order to maximize
effectiveness in the establishment of incentive arrangements in future contracts. The
current research provides for a different theoretical foundation from prior research.
Credible commitment promises a solution from self-serving influences. The
encouragement to use and enforce incentive contracts, if responded to, creates an
automatic mechanism for awarding profit without subjective evaluation. Incentive
contracts are a credible commitment relative to award contracts that have been budgeted
as if the award is inevitable.
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Summary
Is it possible that the BBP initiatives are different than past initiatives? Will the
focus of aligning contractor profitability with contractor performance improve the
defense acquisition system? The next chapter, methodology, discusses how the
researchers plan to answer these questions.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The paper provides a series of statistical tests placing profit margin as the
dependent variable. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression as well as non-parametric
tests are employed to permit a time-series portrayal of the relationship of various
independent variables to profit. This is done first as a simple bivariate analysis and then
as a multivariate analysis to include Stepwise regression. Due to the nature of the
variables, the key relationship between cost variance and profit must be conducted using
contingency tables.
Data
Data was obtained from the Cost Assessment Data Enterprise (CADE). CADE’s
data is compiled from multiple authoritative databases such as Defense Automated Cost
Information Management System (DACIMS) and Defense Acquisition Management
Information Retrieval (DAMIR). The data available in CADE consists of reports such as
Contractor Cost Data Reports (CCDRs), Integrated Program Management Reports
(IPMRs), and Cost Analysis Requirements Descriptions (CARDs).
The profit data, specifically, for each contract was obtained in the form of Cost
Data Summary Reports (CDSRs) which are also often referred to as 1921s. There are
also several other types of 1921s such as the Function Cost-Hour Report (1921-1),
Progress Curve Report (1921-2), and Contractor Business Data Report (1921-3);
however, this report only focuses on the 1921.
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The 1921 contains descriptive data such as program name, contract number,
contract type, contract price and ceiling, period of performance, report cycle (initial,
interim, or final), and cost data broken down by work breakdown structure (WBS) for
both “to date” and “at completion”. In addition to WBS elements, other costs such as
subtotal, general and administrative (G&A), undistributed budget (UB), and management
reserve (MR) are also reported. A blank 1921 is provided in Appendix A for reference.
CDSR reporting is required on ACAT I and ACAT IA programs when the
estimated contract value at completion is greater than $50 million (DoDI 5000.02).
These reports may be generated at the contract level or for a specific task or delivery
order. There are a few exceptions per DoDI 5000.02 to this reporting requirement
(Appendix B). The original database contained 2,032 final CDSRs. A CDSR is
considered final when at least 95% of the contract cost have been incurred and the
government has received its end item. The current study only views completed contracts.
The original database was analyzed for accuracy. There were 5 groups of
exclusions that were identified (Table 6). First, there were 917 subcontractor reports that
were removed as this analysis was strictly utilizing prime contractor reports.
Subcontractors have requirements that are often less stringent than primes for both profit
and earned value reporting. Next, Equation 1 was used to verify that each sample was at
least 95% complete. There were 62 data points that did not meet this threshold and were
excluded. This report focused on development and production contracts; therefore, 54
data points that were labeled as operations and sustainment (O&S) or some other life
cycle phase were excluded. Exclusion #4 was due to missing data on the 1921. The
missing data was primarily samples that did not have an accurate period of performance
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listed or the sample was missing 1 or more of the values that would be required to
calculate profit margin. The majority of the contracts that were missing values were Firm
Fixed Price (FFP) contracts, but there did not appear to be any consistent themes or
trends as to which commodity or contractor had missing values on the 1921. Lastly, the
dataset contained 26 duplicate entries that were excluded. These were most commonly
the result of reports being submitted using two different version of the 1921 (2007 vs
2011). Duplicates were identified by filtering the data by contract number and contract
amount. If these two fields were identical then they were further researched before
removal from the database. The final profit database consisted of 913 samples.
Table 6 – Data Exclusions
Final Reports
Exclusion 1: Subcontractors
Exclusion 2: < 95% Complete
Exclusion 3: Non-Production/Development
Phase
Exclusion 4: Missing Values
Exclusion 5: Duplicates
Final Dataset
Subtotal Cost + G&A (to date)

Where

% 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = Subtotal Costs + G&A + UB (at Completion)

1921s
2032
917
62
54
60
26
913

Equation 1

- Subtotal costs: Total cost provided by the highest level WBS Reporting
Element
- General & Administrative (G&A): Indirect expenses related to overall
management and administration of the contractor's business unit
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- Undistributed Budget (UB): Portion of the budget applicable to program
effort that has not yet been allocated to control account budgets.
The contract cost performance data was obtained from the Earned Value
Management Central Repository (EVM-CR) also located within CADE. EVM-CR
provides a central location for reporting, collecting, and distributing EVM data on ACAT
1 programs. This authoritative database is utilized by OSD, all branches of the armed
forces, and other DOD components. As of November 2018, EVM-CR contained reports
on approximately 80 ACAT 1A, 1C, and 1D programs and 210 contracts and tasks
reporting data (CADE, n.d.). EVM reporting is primarily required for award and
incentive contracts. Reporting requirements are typically based off of the contract values
starting at $20 million. Detailed EVM reporting requirements can be found in Appendix
C.
Monthly EVM reports are submitted by the contractor and reviewed by the
Program Management Offices (PMOs). The primary data from these reports that is used
in this analysis is the Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) and Actual Cost of
Work Performed (ACWP). The definitions of each term are found in Table 8 and can be
used to calculate cost variance using Equations 3 and 4.
The statistical tests in the current report required that a contract or contract line
item number (CLIN) have both EVM and profit data. No available reports had both of
these measures and no contract had a unique identifier that allows linking of reports.
Therefore, the database containing both profit and performance data had to be
constructed manually. The EVM-CR database within CADE was used to search each of
the 913 samples from the profit database. The contract number from the CDSR database
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was searched in EVM-CR system. Next, CLINs, work orders, or task orders were
matched from the CDSR report name or contract task name descriptions to the EVM-CR
reports. In the event that the description from report name or contract task name was not
sufficient in matching to a specific EVM report, the subtotal cost from the CDSR and the
ACWP from the EVM were compared. If those amounts were within 5% of each other
than they were treated as possible matching reports. The periods of performance from
the two different reports were then compared for those possible matches. If they were for
the same period then they were treated as matching reports. There were 85 samples from
the profit database that had EVM reports available but they were not able to be linked
with complete certainty. The samples had the same task order but neither the amounts
nor periods of performance were similar; therefore, they had to be excluded. The final
result was a database consisting of 130 samples across unique 97 contracts that matched
to 130 samples from the CDSR database and EVM databases.
Due to limitations of the data in the current report, the relationship between cost
growth and profit margin is not easily examined. In the logical OLS format, the actual
cost of work performed (ACWP) would be on one side of the relationship and contract
subtotal cost would be on the other side. However, these amounts are fundamentally the
same thing and would be acting on both sides of the relationship. Profit margin contains
subtotal cost in the denominator of its formula as seen in Equation 2 and the variables are
defined in Table 7. Subtotal cost is defined as “total cost provided by the highest level
WBS Reporting Element.” Cost growth is measured using cost variance which is the
difference in the budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP) and the actual cost of work
performed (ACWP). Variance is analyzed as a percentage of BCWP. The formulas for
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cost variance are shown in Equation 3 and 4 and defined in Table 8. Due to these
similarities, statistical analysis using regression between cost growth and profit margin is
not permitted as the slope would be indeterminate.
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷

𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 (%) = 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄𝒄+𝑮𝑮&𝑨𝑨+𝑼𝑼𝑼𝑼+𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴

Equation 2

Table 7 - Profit Margin Definitions

Term

Profit/Loss or Fee

Subtotal Cost

Definition
Profit is the excess of revenues over expenses in fixed-price contracts. Loss is the excess of
expenses over revenue in contracts that contain limited Government liability such as fixed-price
contracts and cost plus contracts with cost ceilings. In special cost-reimbursement pricing
arrangements, fee is a form of profit representing an agreed-to amount beyond the initial estimate
of costs that reflects a variety of factors, including risk, and is subject to statutory limitations.
Fee may be fixed at the outset of performance, as in a cost-plus-fixed-fee arrangement, or may
vary (within a contractually specified minimum maximum range) during performance, as in a
cost-plus-incentive-fee arrangement.
Total cost provided by the highest level WBS Reporting Element

Indirect expenses related to the overall management and administration of the contractor’s
business unit, including the following: a company’s general and executive offices; the cost of
General and Administrative staff services such as legal, accounting, public relations, financial, and similar expenses; and
(G&A)
other general expenses. G&A is also a generic term used to describe expenses with a beneficial
or causal relationship to cost objectives that cannot be more accurately assigned to overhead
areas for Engineering, Manufacturing Operations, Material, and so on.
Undistributed Budget (UB) The portion of the budget applicable to program effort that has not yet been allocated to control
account budgets or to Management Reserve.
The amount of the total allocated budget that is held back for management control and risk
Management Reserve (MR) purposes at the total contract level rather than designated for the accomplishment of specific
tasks.

Source: Data item description “Cost Data Summary Report", 2011

Cost Variance (CV) = BCWP – ACWP
CV% = (CV / BCWP) ∗ 100
Table 8 - Cost Variance Definitions
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(Equation 3)
(Equation 4)

Due to the previously mentioned limitations in comparing profit margin and cost
variance, other variables are analyzed in order to determine their significance in
predicting profit margin. In a few instances, variables are also tested against a dependent
variable for cost growth in order to provide a more holistic view of the analysis. These
variables fall into 1 of 3 categories: technical, economical, or environmental.
Technical variables are primarily categorical variables that are obtained from the
contractor’s Cost Data Summary Report (CDSR). They are as follows:
•

Commodity

•

Branch of Service

•

Contractor

•

Life Cycle Phase

•

Contract Type

•

Incentive Structure

•

Period of Performance Start Year

This paper does not analyze in detail each of these variables as most are not
significant predictors; however, a detailed listing for each variable is provided in
Appendix D through I that contains the sample size, mean cost variance, and mean profit
margin for the variable with regard to all years, the years before 2011, and the years after
2010.
Most of the variables are self-explanatory and will be discussed as needed
throughout the analysis. However, the two variables for profit structure and contract type
require further clarification. Contract type originally contained 16 unique inputs when
pulled from the CDSRs. These inputs were condensed into contract types of Cost, Fixed,
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and Mixed. Mixed samples are those containing multiple CLINs or work orders with
both a cost and fixed type of contract. The same listing was also used to create variables
for profit structure. Variables of “IF” for incentive fee or “AF” for award fee established.
There were 8 samples that contained both incentive and award fee structures and 28
samples where the 1921 did not indicate either type.
Two of the primary technical variables that are analyzed are the period of
performance start year and incentive structure. The period of performance start year is
important for the time-series part of the analysis. In order to determine if Better Buying
Power has been effective, a binary variable was created that would result in ‘1’ if the
period of performance start year was greater than 2010 and would result in ‘0’ if not. The
second key variable was profit structure. The profit structure could either be incentive
fee (IF), award fee (AF), both incentive and award, or neither incentive or award.
Separate binary variables were created for both IF and AF where the result would be a ‘1’
if the sample was strictly IF or AF and a ‘0’ if not. The time and profit structure
variables can be directly linked to specific aspects of Better Buying Power and may
provide the most measurable insight in analyzing whether Better Buying Power has been
implemented effectively.
Economic variables were also included to test whether it’s a changing economy
that is resulting in increasing profit margins or if the changes may be the result of some
other factor such as the implementation of Better Buying Power. Economic variables for
the gross domestic product rate change from prior year, federal funds rate, unemployment
rate, and the service’s budget during the year of contract performance start. The rates for
each variable are associated with the period of performance start year. The data for each
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variable was obtained from authoritative sources such as the Bureau of Economic
Analyses, Federal Reserve website, and the President’s Budget.
Environmental variables were analyzed to account for signals that contractors
may have received from prior knowledge of DoD acquisitions. They are all exploratory
in nature. They are proxies designed to capture the influence of observable signals to the
contractor that the government is serious. These variables are included as an extension of
game theory; whereas, a coordination game is resolve through one agent picking up a
signal of credible commitment. As such, variables for the median profit from prior years
are introduced into the model. One variable captures the prior year median profit margin
for the EVM only contracts (130 samples) while another variable captures the median
profit margin from the larger, non-EVM dataset (913 samples). The variables derived
from the larger dataset excluded the 130 samples used in the smaller dataset. The theory
is that contactors are aware of the overall DoD climate of profit and it may influence their
behavior.
Statistical Analysis
The intent of a profit incentive is to adequately reward a contractor for their
performance. Performance is normally measured in terms of technicality, cost, and
schedule. This analysis is only focused on cost performance in the form of cost
variance/growth. The hypothesis would be that cost growth declines (increases) as profit
margin increases (decreases). This thesis has 3 research questions which are as follows:
1. What trends of profit margin and cost growth are observed over time?
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2. Does the relationship between profit margin and cost growth, relative to
BBP’s initiation in 2010, change in such a way that would lead one to
identify an independent effect from other changes within the DoD
environment?
3. To what degree can we attribute changes in profit and performance to the
larger economy, program aspects, and overall policy?
In order to assess trends over time for the first research question, OLS regression
is used to fit a regression line using profit margin as a dependent variable and the start
year of the period of performance (POP) as an independent variable. The same process is
done using cost variance as a dependent variable and time as the independent variable.
Additionally, these same trends are examined for both incentive only contracts and nonincentive contracts. All statistical tests in this analysis use an alpha of 0.05.
The second research question looks to examine the relationship of profit margin
and cost growth relative to the year 2010 when BBP was initiated. If BBP has been
affective then we would expect to see cost growth declining post-2010 and profit margin
increasing post-2010. In addition, BBP encouraged the use of incentive structured
contracts vs award structures. We’d expect to see an increase in the incentive type
contract post-2010 and a reduction in award type contracts. For this part of the research,
bivariate, non-parametric analysis is used with profit margin as a dependent variable and
also with cost variance as a dependent variable. The independent variables used were all
binary, dummy variables. The first dummy variable used was based off of the POP start
year. The second variable was based on the profit structure. The Wilcoxon Test is used
to test whether the differences in the medians is significant using an alpha of 0.05.
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The analysis for research question #3 has 3 parts. First, a one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) is used to test the significance of the economic variables. The
environmental variables were also explored using a one-way ANOVA. If the p-value
from the ANOVAs is less than 0.05 than the tested variable is considered to be a
significant predictor of profit martin or cost variance.
The second part of the analysis utilized Stepwise Regression to determine the
best-fitting model using all technical, economic, and environmental variables. The intent
of the model is not to predict future profit margin. Instead, it is used to determine how
much of the variance can be explained. Since cost variance cannot be used as an
independent variable with profit margin, we would expect the model to have a large
amount of unexplained variance (low r-squared). The theory is that performance as an
independent variable would be able to explain more of the observed variance. This
regression model is tested for normality using a Shapiro Wilk Goodness-of-Fit Test and
constant variance using Breusch-Pagan Test. In addition, studentized residuals are used
to explore potential outliers and Cook’s Distance is used to explore any overly influential
data points.
Due to the limitations mentioned previously with using regression to relate profit
margin and cost variance, contingency tables were used. A contingency table is a
statistical tool that allows for the analysis of the relationship between at least two nominal
variables using rows and columns. The table provides for probability-related calculations
in order to confirm whether two variables are truly independent. The current research
used the median profit margin before 2011 (9.79%) and the mean cost variance % prior to
2011 (1.14%) in order to establish binary, categorical variables. If the median profit
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margin or median cost variance was greater than the median of the data prior to 2011 then
it received a ‘1’ while everything less than the median during the same period would be
labeled a ‘0’.
Pearson’s Chi-Squared Test and the Odds-Ratio Test for significance are more
commonly used tests for independence. However, these tests require larger sample sizes
to support the p-value approximation that is provides. The current research utilizes
Fisher’s Exact Test as it is preferred when dealing with smaller sample sizes. One benefit
to the Fisher’s Exact Test is that it provides an exact calculation of a p-value given the
data presented (Agresti, 1992).
Fisher’s Exact can be used for both 1 and 2-tailed hypothesis tests. However, the
current research uses only a 1-tailed test to test the relationship between cost growth (x)
and profit margin (y). The hypothesis for a left-tailed test is as follows:
Ho: The median CV% and profit % are independent of each other
Ha: The probability (sample profit margin > than the median profit margin prior to
2011) is greater when the observed CV% is less than the median CV% prior to
2011
For the current research, the p-value for the left-tailed test is expected to be less
than 0.05. This would signal that cost growth and profit margin are not independent. If
this hypothesis is true then that would further support the claim that Better Buying Power
has been effective in improving the DoD acquisition community by bettering aligning
profitability and performance.
Lastly, sensitivity analysis was performed in order to determine if the observed
trends post-2010 are due to Better Buying Power or if it’s possible that the acquisition
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environment was already improving. The dummy variable for the Period of Performance
Start Year was adjusted to use 2008 as a reference point. Anything after 2008 would be
coded a ‘1’ and anything prior to 2009 would be labeled a ‘0’. The same non-parametric
and regression tests that were utilized previously were used with this new time variable.
If the acquisition environment was already improving in 2008 then we cannot say with
complete certainty that the observed changes after 2010 are the direct result of BBP.
Summary
Chapter 3 has discussed the sources of the data used in the current research. In
addition, the methods of combining the profit and performance databases were described.
Next, statistical analysis using non-parametrics, OLS regression, and contingency tables
is discussed. The results of these tests are discussed in Chapter 4.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Overview
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) has recently reported reduced cost variance on earned
value contracts (Davis & Anton, 2016). The positive trends that are presented in this
chapter may be capturing what the acquisition community has aimed for with the
implementation of Better Buying Power. These results reflect that the DoD may be
willing to pay a higher profit in exchange for better performance on contracts. This
chapter looks to examine what trends, if any, are reflected in the data, how has profit
margin and the use of incentive contracts changed since the implementation of Better
Buying Power in 2010, and to what degree can we relate the observed changes to Better
Buying Power? The current research aims to link profit and performance into one
analysis and determine whether the reduced cost variance occurs with contracts that
receive higher profit margins over the 2001-2016 timeframe, or whether it is an artifact of
some other driver.
This chapter discusses the analysis and results starting with descriptive statistics.
Next, the results of the non-parametric and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression are
discussed and significant correlations of profit margin are identified. The correlations
fall into 3 categories: technical, economical, and environmental. Economic and
environmental variables are introduced into the regression in order to test the effect that
each one may have on profit margin as it could potentially be factors outside of the DoD
that are responsible for the acquisition improvements. Contingency tables are introduced
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along with their results in order to examine the relationship between profit margin and
cost variance together. Finally, the sensitivity analysis is discussed.
Descriptive Statistics
The database consisted of the following 6 categorical variables: commodity,
branch of service, contract type, incentive structure, contractor, and contract phase. The
distributions of each of these variables in shown in Table 9 and the mean profit margins
and cost variances for each can be found in Appendix D through Appendix I. Some
variables were not used in the analysis but their distributions are provided in the
Appendix to allow for a more complete picture of the database.
Descriptive statistics in the data set are broken down into 3 groups: all years, pre2011, and post-2010. The dataset of 130 samples had a median cost variance of 0.99%
and a median profit margin 13.21% when all years are included (Table 9). The cost
variance reported is not as high as others have reported e.g. Drezner et al. (1993).
Drezner examined program SARs from 1960-1990 in his analysis and found the mean
cost growth to be around 20%. The difference between the current research and
Drezner’s research is likely due to the current research focusing on specific CLINs and
work orders while Drezner looked at program level data from the Selected Acquisition
Reports (SARs).
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Table 9- Variable Distributions
Total Samples

130

Commodity
Aircraft
Ship
UAV
Electronic/Automated
Software

#
44
24
22

Missiles
Space
Ordinance
Surface Vehicle
Service
Navy
Air Force
Army
DoD (Joint)
POP Start Year

12
5
2
2
#
74
30
21
5
#

2001
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
<2011
>2010

19

3
4
3
3
12
13
11
12
17
12
15
12
8
4
1
78
52
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Profit
Structure
Incentive
Neither
Award Fee
Both
Contract
Type
Cost
Fixed
Mixed
Phase
Production
Development
Contractor
Contractor A
Contractor B
Contractor C
Contractor D
Contractor E
Contractor F
Contractor G
Contractor H
Contractor I
Contractor J
Contractor K
Contractor L
Contractor M
Contractor N
Contractor O
Contractor P
Contractor Q
Contractor R
Contractor S

#
72
28
22
8
#
72
51
7
#
73
57
#
20
19
14
13
12
10
9
6
5
5
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1

Technical Variables
Using the descriptive statistics presented in Table 10, we can analyze the trends
over time by plotting the profit margin and cost variance with the Period of Performance
Start Year. Figure 1 shows the plot of profit margin by the POP start year. The POP start
year has been normalized to the year 2000 so ‘0’ on the figure would be representative of
the year 2000, ‘10’ would represent the year 2010, etc. The red trend line shows that
profit margin is positively correlated with the POP start year. The POP start date is a
significant predictor of profit margin as the t-statistic produced a p-value less .0001 as
seen in Table 11. The regression result can be interpreted as each year starting with 2000
adding an additional 0.7% to profit margin.
Table 10 - Descriptive Statistics

Mean
Median
Std Dev
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N

All Samples
Cost
Profit
Variance % Margin %
2.86
10.49
0.99
13.21
10
6.7
4.59
11.65
1.12
9.33
130
130

Year < 2011
Cost
Profit
Variance %
Margin %
4.74
8.90
1.14
9.79
10.25
6.36
7.05
10.33
2.43
7.46
78
78

Year > 2010
Cost
Profit
Variance %
Margin %
0.03
12.87
0.33
10.91
8.98
6.53
2.53
14.69
-2.47
11.05
52
52

Figure 1 - Profit % by POP Start (Normalized)
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Table 11 - Parameter Estimate Profit % by POP Start
Term
Intercept
POP Start (Normalize 2000)
RSquare

Estimate Std Error
0.0391
0.0169
0.0070
0.0017
0.1165

t Ratio
2.31
4.11

Prob>|t|
0.0224*
<.0001*

Figure 2 reflects cost variance % by the normalized POP start date. CV% is
negatively correlated with the POP start year as visualized by the red trend line and via
the negative estimate shown in Table 12. POP start is a significant predictor of CV%
with a p-value of 0.0049. The regression output can be interpreted as each years’ cost
variance declines by 0.75% starting in year 2000.

Figure 2 - Cost Variance % by POP Start (Normalized)
Table 12 - Parameter Estimate CV % by POP Start
Term
Intercept
POP Start (Normalize 2000)
RSquare

Estimate
0.0991
-0.0075
0.0602

Std Error
0.0261
0.0026

t Ratio
3.80
-2.86

Prob>|t|
0.0002*
0.0049*

The research has shown trends that we would expect to see if BBP has been
successful in better aligning profit to performance. Next, the periods pre-2011 and post2010 are analyzed for changes. There were 78 samples pre-2011 and 52 samples post43

2010. The summary statistics in Table 10 reflect that cost variance has declined and
profit margin has increased from the time pre-2011 to post-2010. Median profit margin
increased from 9.79% to 10.91% while median cost variance declined from 1.14% to
0.33%. Both of these results may be indicative of the Better Buying Power initiative
improving the acquisition environment as intended through the better alignment of
profitability to performance.
The non-parametric Wilcoxon Test was utilized to test the significance in the
changing medians. The benefit of non-parametric analysis is that outliers are ignored.
The null hypothesis with this test would be that the medians are the same and the
alternate would be that the medians are statistically different. Figure 3 shows the results
of the test using profit margin as a dependent variable and the dummy variable for pre2011/post-2010 as the independent variable. The p-value is less than 0.05 so the null
hypothesis is rejected and the medians are considered to be statistically different.

Figure 3- Profit Margin Pre-Post Wilcoxon
A similar non-parametric test was completed using cost variance as the dependent
variable. The results are reflected in Figure 4. The difference in median cost variance
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pre-2011 and post-2010 is statistically significant with a p-value of .0351. Both of these
results support the claim that BBP has been effective. Next, the use of incentive
contracts is examined.

Figure 4- Cost Variance % Pre-Post Wilcoxon
Better Buying Power encouraged the use of incentive-based contracts over award
fee. Table 13 shows the data breakdown based on if the contract type contained an
incentive (IF) or award (AF) profit structure. There were 28 samples where the contract
type did not contain IF or AF. In addition, there were 8 contracts that contained both IF
and AF. This is due to a sample reporting multiple CLINs that had different contract
types and/or profit structures. Over 61% of the data contained some sort of incentive
structure. For the data post-2010, samples with AF only and those containing both IF and
AF reported small sample sizes. As such, the reliance on the measures of central
tendency in these categories must be discounted.
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Table 13 - Incentive Structure

Profit Structure
IF
AF
Neither
Both

Number
72
22
28
8

All Samples
Median CV%
1.27
1.11
-0.02
3.28

Median Profit % Number
10.84
35
8.89
20
10.29
17
10.86
6

Year < 2011
Median CV% Median Profit % Number
8.77
6.62
37
0.35
8.77
2
0.02
10.33
11
3.28
10.86
2

Year > 2010
Median CV% Median Profit %
-0.65
11.10
5.61
10.00
-0.14
10.25
5.74
9.35

Table 14 reflects the number of samples by period of performance start year.
Additionally, the table depicts the number of IF only and AF only samples along with
each ones respective percentage of the total database. Figure 5 provide a visual
representation that the number of IF contracts as a percentage of total contracts in the
database has increased during the Better Buying Power era while the number of AF
contracts has declined. The decline in IF contracts in years 2014-2016 is not concerning
as this is likely due to the lack of samples available in those years. The lack of samples
in those years is due to this analysis only using completed projects and the majority of
projects that started after 2013 may still be in progress.
Better Buying Power was first introduced in 2010 which is why the data is shown
for all samples, pre-2011, and post-2010. At first glance, it appears that the biggest
change is for IF contracts. They account for a higher percentage of the whole set, and
they show a dramatic decrease in cost variance and an increase in profit margin. The
others suggest business as usual. The non-parametric Wilcoxon Test was used to test the
significance in the changing medians. If the p-values from the test were less than 0.05
then the difference in the medians is considered significant.
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Table 14 - IF/AF Distribution by POP Year
#
#
Total
Incentive % of Award
% of
Year Samples
Only
Total
Only
Total
2001
3
0
0.0%
3
100.0%
2003
4
2
50.0%
1
25.0%
2004
3
1
33.3%
2
66.7%
2005
3
1
33.3%
1
33.3%
2006
12
4
33.3%
5
41.7%
2007
13
5
38.5%
3
23.1%
2008
11
6
54.5%
2
18.2%
2009
12
7
58.3%
1
8.3%
2010
17
9
52.9%
2
11.8%
2011
12
8
66.7%
1
8.3%
2012
15
11
73.3%
1
6.7%
2013
12
9
75.0%
0
0.0%
2014
8
6
75.0%
0
0.0%
2015
4
3
75.0%
0
0.0%
2016
1
0
0.0%
0
0.0%
<2011
78
35
44.9%
20
25.6%
>2010
52
37
71.2%
2
3.8%

IF Only by AF Only (% of total)
150.00%
100.00%
50.00%
0.00%
2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

% of Total Incentive

2010

2012

2014

% of Total Award

Figure 5- Incentive Only by Award Fee Only Distribution
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2016

Table 15 and 16 provides the results of the non-parametric test for differences in
medians. For contracts containing only an incentive structure, the median profit margin
increased from 6.62% to 11.10%. The Wilcoxon Test validates that the difference in
means is significant with a p-value of 0.0041. The difference in medians for the nonincentive contracts before and after 2010 was not significant. As such we cannot reject
the null. This suggests nothing has changed in the non-IF acquisition process.
For the period before 2011, non-incentive contracts received a higher profit
margin at 10.03% compared to the 6.62% received by those with an incentive structure.
The Wilcoxon Test results show that the difference in those means is not significant. For
the period post-2010, IF contracts received a higher profit margin of 11.10% when
compared to the 10.25% received by the non-incentive contracts. The Wilcoxon Test
resulted in a p-value of 0.2710 which indicates that the difference in medians in not
significant.
Table 15 - Profit Margin Wilcoxon Test on Incentive and Pre-2011 / Post-2010
Profit
IF
Non-IF

Pre-2011
6.62%
10.03%
0.1411

Post-2010
11.10%
10.25%
0.271

Pvalues
0.0041
0.5881

Similarly, cost variance was examined with the same time and incentive variables
(Table 16). The difference in median cost variance for contracts containing only an
incentive structure was significant with a p-value of 0.0031. Likewise, the difference in
median cost variance for IF and non-IF contracts for the pre-2011 period was also
significant. The post-2010 period comparing IF and non-IF did not result in a significant
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difference in medians. This is likely due to the lack of non-IF samples post-2010. Post2010 non-IF samples reported median values that were not statistically significant.

Table 16 - Cost Variance Wilcoxon Test on Incentive and Pre-2011 / Post-2010
Cost
IF
Non-IF

Pre-2011
8.77%
0.22%
0.0048

Post-2010
-0.65%
1.09%
0.5649

Pvalues
0.0031
0.9504

So far the analysis has shown that there is a statistically significant difference in
median profit margin and median cost variance during the period’s pre-2011 and post2010. The median profit margin increased from one period to the next while cost
variance declined. The statistics presented in Tables 15 and 16 show that profit margin
increased on IF contracts from pre-2011 to post-2010, cost variance declined on IF
samples during the same period, and Table 13 reflects the increased use of incentive
structured contracts as opposed to award fee.
When buying a home, some buyers may choose to pay an upfront fee in exchange
for a lower interest rate on the mortgage. This is known as “buying down the rate”.
Similarly, using the results in this analysis, we may infer that the DoD has chosen to buydown rate of cost variance by agreeing to pay a higher profit margin. Better Buying
Power called for better alignment of a contractor’s profitability with their performance.
The DoD’s willingness to pay a higher profit in exchange for better performance sends a
signal to the contractor that their performance matters.
In a 2013 testimony to the House of Representatives, Pierre Chao stated that
“Culturally, we have evolved to a point where we would rather pay $1 billion and 5%
profit for a defense good, than $500 million and a 20% profit” (Twenty-five Years, 2013)
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Increased profit margins are not to be seen as a negative for the DoD. Former Under
Secretary of Defense for AT&L, Frank Kendall, argued that capitalism results in
industries striving to maximize profit. The DoD has the responsibility of both protecting
taxpayer’s interests but also ensuring fair treatment of industry partners. Without
reasonable profit, the industries have no incentive to work with the DoD. Kendall also
contends “we (DoD) will benefit if profit incentives provide effective motivation to
industry and are tied to the goals we value” (Kendall, 2015).
Economic Variables
As discussed in Chapter 2, acquisition reforms have not always been successful or
shown results as originally intended. For the current research, it is possible that a
changing economy or other factor outside of the DoD’s control have been the reason for
profit margin’s increasing while cost variance has decreased. In order to account for
these economic conditions, the following variables were tested:
•

Gross Domestic Product % Change Year Prior to POP Start

•

Federal Fund Rate of the POP Start Year

•

Unemployment Rate of the POP Start Year

•

Service’s Budget of the POP Start Year
When analyzing these economic variables with profit margin, the only significant

variable was the Federal Fund rate with a p-value of 0.0097 and an R-square of 0.0511
(Table 17). There was negative correlation between the Fed Fund rate and profit margin
so as the rate increases, profit margins declined. This variable by itself does not explain
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much, but it may prove to be more useful in the multivariate analysis. The other three
variables tested did not result in significant findings.
Table 17 - Parameter Estimates Profit % by Economic Variables
Parameter Estimates- Profit % to GDP % Change Prior Yr
Term
Intercept
GDP % Change Prior Year
RSquare

Estimate
0.1075
-0.1536
0.0013

Std Error
0.0086
0.3726

t Ratio
12.53
-0.41

Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.6809

Parameter Estimates- Profit % to Fed Rate POP Start
Term
Intercept
FedRatePopStart
RSquare

Estimate
0.1158
-0.8302
0.0511

Std Error
0.0071
0.3163

t Ratio
16.31
-2.62

Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.0097

Parameter Estimates- Profit % to Unemployment POP Start
Term
Intercept
Unemployment PopStart
RSquare

Estimate
0.0896
0.2163
0.0035

Std Error
0.0234
0.3220

t Ratio
3.82
0.67

Prob>|t|
0.0002
0.5030

Parameter Estimates- Profit % to Service Budget POP Start
Term
Intercept
Service Budget by Year
RSquare

Estimate
0.0986
0.0000
0.0021

Std Error
0.0136
0.0001

t Ratio
7.25
0.51

Prob>|t|
<.0001
0.6079

Multivariate Regression
Bivariate analysis provided some insight into the variables that correlate with
profit margin. However, multivariate regression can be utilized to further explore which
combination of factors may correlate with profit margin and to what extent. Using
stepwise regression, the variables discussed throughout Chapter 4 were explored in order
to find the combination of variables that best fits the data. The stepwise regression used a
p-value threshold of 0.05 when determining the best fit. Stepwise regression does not test
the assumptions of normality, constant variance, or multi-collinearity when determining
the best fit. Therefore, the test of those assumptions are provided as well.
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The results of the regression are shown in Table 18. The model had 6 variables
that were all significant as indicated by the p-values (Prob<|t|) less than 0.05. All
variables are binary variables of ‘1’ or ‘0’. The model’s R-square was 0.3736 which may
be considered relatively low. However, the model, for reasons previously explained,
cannot include cost variance as an independent variable with profit margin as the
dependent variable. The economic variables were not significant enough to be included
in the model. The absence of these variables may signal that the changes being observed
are internal to the Department of Defense.
Table 18 - Multivariate Results
Term
Intercept
DV_Aircraft
DV_AF
Contractor E
Contractor H
DV_Fixed
POP Start DV_2010+
RSquare

Estimate
0.0588
0.0421
0.0287
0.0505
-0.1049
0.0339
0.0303
0.3736

Std Error
0.0093
0.0106
0.0116
0.0176
0.0250
0.0105
0.0101

t Ratio
6.33
3.97
2.47
2.88
-4.20
3.24
3.00

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0001*
0.0148*
0.0048*
<.0001*
0.0015*
0.0033*

Std Beta
0
0.2988
0.1813
0.2191
-0.3298
0.2478
0.2225

VIF
.
1.1100
1.0566
1.1403
1.2103
1.1486
1.0822

The 6 variables that did show significance in the model were as follows:
Commodity-Aircraft, Service-Air Force, Contractor E, Contractor H, Contract TypeFixed, and Period of Performance Start Year >2010. All variables were binary. The
database had 44 samples that were aircraft. This variable had the second highest effect as
determined by taking the absolute value of the standard beta shown in Table 18. There
were 30 Air Force samples in the database and this variable had the least effect of the 6
variables. Contractor E had 12 samples in the database with 8 being Navy contracts and
4 Army. The variable with the highest effect using standard beta was Contractor H. This
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contractor experienced poor performance on 6 samples. However, 5 of the 6 samples
were all for the same Navy program. Each report was for performance on different
periods of the project. Next, the variable for fixed contract type was significant in the
model. There were 51 fixed samples which were 68% Navy. These 51 samples were
mostly commodities of aircraft or ships. Fixed type contracts would be expected to earn
more profit than cost contracts as fixed contracts contain more risk for the contractor.
Lastly, the variable distinguishing between pre-2011 and post-2010 was significant.
There were 52 samples post-2010 in which 31% of these were aircraft and 52% were
Navy. The results were then tested for normality, constant variance, multi-collinearity,
outliers, and any other overly influential data points.
The test for normality was completed using a Shapiro-Wilk Test on the residuals
from the Table 18 model. This test used the following hypothesis:
•

Ho: Residuals are Normally Distributed

•

Ha: NOT normal

The goodness-of-fit test for normality resulted in a p-value of 0.0253 which leads to the
null hypothesis being rejected. However, the shape of the plotted distribution of the
residuals must also be considered before rejecting (Figure 6). The shape of the
distribution could be considered to be “approximately normal”; therefore, the test for
normality would be a “soft-fail” and the analysis could continue.
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Figure 6 - Residuals Plotted for Test of Normality

A Breusch-Pagan (BP) test for constant variance was also performed. The
hypothesis for this test was as follows:
•

Ho: Residuals have Constant Variance

•

Ha: Residuals do NOT have constant Variance

The BP test resulted in a p-value of <0.0001 so the null hypothesis would be rejected.
Since this test failed, the lognormal value of the dependent variable (profit margin %)
was used to re-run the test. The p-value of the BP test when using the lognormal value
was also <0.0001 which would result in the test failing for constant variance. As a result,
similar to the test for normality, the plotted distribution of the residuals from the model in
Table 18 can be observed for a possible “soft-fail”. As seen in Figure 7, there is no
apparent pattern or other distinguishing shape to the plotted data that would indicate a
violation of constant variance. The result is determined to be a “soft-fail”.
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Figure 7 - Residuals by Predicted Plot for Constant Variance
The test for multi-collinearity was accomplished using variance inflation factors
(VIF). VIF is the relation of the variance in a multivariate model divided by the variance
of a bivariate model. Table 18 shows the VIF scores for each variable. Generally, any
VIF score greater than 5.0 would require further analysis as multi-collinearity may be an
issue. None of the variables in the current research have concerns for multi-collinearity.
Next, the impact of any potential outliers was examined by plotting the model’s
studentized residuals. There were two data points that exceeded 3 standard deviations.
These samples were excluded and the model was re-analyzed without them. This
resulted in the dummy variable for Air Force no longer being significant. The two data
points were added back into the model and the variable for Air Force was removed. The
updated model is reflect in Table 19.
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Table 19- Updated Multi-regression Model
Analysis of Variance
Source

DF

Model
Error
C. Total

5
124
129

Sum of
Squares
0.19823079
0.38049673
0.57872752

Mean Square

F Ratio

0.039646
0.003069

12.9203
Prob > F
<.0001*

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
DV_Aircraft
General Dynamics
Huntington Ingalls
DV_Fixed
POP Start DV_2010+
RSqaure

Estimate
0.067331
0.04019
0.042135
-0.1131
0.0335404
0.0303088
0.3425

Std Error
0.008788
0.010787
0.017587
0.025246
0.010663
0.010317

t Ratio
7.66
3.73
2.40
-4.48
3.15
2.94

Prob>|t|
<.0001*
0.0003*
0.0181*
<.0001*
0.0021*
0.0039*

Std Beta
0
0.285026
0.182796
-0.35566
0.245447
0.222541

VIF
.
1.1038701
1.0979195
1.1887
1.1484716
1.0822298

Using the new model, the previously tested assumptions were re-accomplished.
The test for normality also failed the Shapiro Wilk Test. However, the residuals reflect
(Figure 8) what most would consider to be a normal distribution with the data grouped
around 0 and no large groupings in the tails of the distribution. We consider this to be a
soft-fail.

Figure 8- Model 2 Residuals Plotted for Test of Normality
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The test for constant variance failed when using the BP Test as it did in the first
model. The test also failed when using the lognormal of the dependent variable Profit
Margin %. The residuals by predicted plot in Figure 9 reflect no apparent pattern or other
distinguishing shape to the plotted data that would indicate a violation of constant
variance. We consider this to be a soft-fail of the test for constant variance.

Figure 9- Model 2 Residuals by Predicted Plot for Constant Variance
The test for multi-collinearity reflected no issues as indicated by the VIF scores in
Table 19. As before, the test for outliers using studentized residuals had two data points
exceeded 3 standard deviations. However, if those points are excluded, the model’s
results do not change as they did when the variable for Air Force was included.
Therefore, the 2 samples remain in the model as they do not change the overall results.
Cook’s Distance Test is used to determine if there are any overly influential
samples in the dataset. Any sample with a Cook’s D point higher than 0.5 would need to
be investigated further as it could be overly affecting the model’s results. This model had
no data points exceeding the 0.5 threshold.
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Environmental Variables
In order to account for the overall acquisition environment, variables were created
that represented the median profit margin in the prior years. One variable used the EVM
data only along with the median profit margin in the year prior to the POP start year. The
other variable used the median profit margin from the larger dataset of 913 samples. The
130 samples that were used in the primary analysis were excluded and the median profit
margin of the remaining 783 samples were used to calculate a median profit margin for
each period of performance start year. The reasoning for these variables is that it is
possible that contractors may act on knowledge of profit potential and performance from
prior periods. For instance, in a 2007 contract negotiation, a contractor may know that
the median profit margin was high in the previous year and suspect that the current
environment suggests even higher potential profits now. This information could then be
used during contract negotiations in 2008.
The result of using median profit from the year prior as a predictor of profit
margin is shown in Table 20 for both variables tested. In the bivariate analysis, median
profit from the prior year is not a significant predictor of current profit margin. These
results simply state that the variables we tested are not significant. However, it is
possible that contractors are still using environmental signals that were not tested in this
analysis when negotiation profit.

58

Table 20 - Parameter Estimate Profit % by Mean Profit Yr Prior (EVM Only)

Contingency Tables
Previously discussed limitations with OLS regression did not allow for the use of
cost variance as a predictor of profit margin. However, contingency tables can be used to
explore the relationship between the two variables by converting each variable to a
nominal variable.
Figure 10 is a contingency table that uses nominal variables for profit margin and
cost variance. These two variables are setup as binary where a ‘1’ is assigned if the profit
margin or cost variance is greater than the median of the pre-2011 data. The median
profit margin prior to 2011 was 9.79%. The y-axis would be a ‘1’ (red) if a samples
profit margin were greater than 9.79%. The same is true for CV% on the x-axis. If CV%
is greater than the mean of 1.14% prior to 2011 than a ‘1’ was assigned (blue).
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Figure 10 - Contingency Table Profit Margin by Cost Variance %
The figure can be interpreted as the profit margin was greater than the median
74.2% of the time when cost variance was less than the median. Likewise, cost variance
was greater than the median 64.1% of the time when profit margin was less than the
median. There was a 35.9% chance that both profit margin and cost variance were
greater than the medians and a 25.8% chance that both were less than the median. From
this figure, it can be concluded that profit margin and performance are inversely related,
and as the profit margin increases over the median from prior-2011, there’s a higher
probability for cost growth to remain under the median that existed prior to 2011.
The following hypothesis was used to test the contingency table for
independence:
Ho: The median CV% and profit % are independent of each other
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Ha: The probability (sample profit margin > than the median profit margin prior to
2011) is greater when the observed CV% is less than the median CV% prior to
2011
The Fisher’s Exact Test resulted in a p-value of <0.0001 for the left-tailed test.
Since this value was less than 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected. This signals that the
two variables are dependent of each other and that the likelihood of profit margin
exceeding 9.79% is more probable when the cost variance is less than 1.14%.
Sensitivity Analysis
It may be contested that the chosen year of 2010 captures an effect that would be
found by choosing another year. That is a concern for the study, and a sensitivity
analysis was conducted using the year 2008 as a dividing year. This sensitivity analysis
will assist in answering the final research question which revolves around the degree in
which we can relate profit and performance to overall policy and program aspects.
First, the sensitivity analysis used the non-parametric Wilcoxon Test to test for
significant difference in medians for both profit margin and cost variance during the pre2009 period and post-2008 period. When using profit margin as the dependent variable,
the p-value was 0.0224 indicating the medians were significantly different. When using
cost variance as the dependent variable, the medians were also significantly different with
a p-value of 0.0261.
Next, similar to what was accomplished earlier in chapter 4, the difference in IF
and Non-IF contracts during the pre-2009 and post-2008 period was analyzed for both
profit and cost variance. These results are shown in Table 21. For easier reference, the
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previous results using 2010 as a cutoff are provided under the sensitivity results. For
profit margin, the difference in medians between IF and Non-IF contracts is statistically
significant during the pre-2009 period. The post-2008 is not statistically significant at an
alpha of 0.05; however, the p-value is fairly close when using a one-tailed test (0.0517)
so it’s worth mentioning. The difference in medians for IF contracts pre-2009 and post2008 is statistically significant. For cost variance (right-side of Table 21), we see the
same results that we saw when using the 2010 as a reference year.
Table 21-Wilcoxon Results for Sensitivity Analysis
Profit
IF
Non-IF

Pre-2009
2.81%
10.45%
0.0097

Post-2008
11.17%
9.72%
0.1034

Pvalues
0.0008
0.4936

Cost
IF
Non-IF

Pre-2009
15.80%
0.13%
0.0003

Post-2008
-0.65%
0.96%
0.5513

Pvalues
0.0002
0.7088

Profit
IF
Non-IF

Pre-2011
6.62%
10.03%
0.1411

Post-2010
11.10%
10.25%
0.271

Pvalues
0.0041
0.5881

Cost
IF
Non-IF

Pre-2011
8.77%
0.22%
0.0048

Post-2010
-0.65%
1.09%
0.5649

Pvalues
0.0031
0.9504

The results of the sensitivity analysis reflect that the DoD acquisition environment
was improving before 2010. Therefore, we are unable to link the observed changes
directly to the Better Buying Power initiative. This, however, doesn’t mean that BBP has
been completely ineffective.
Overall Analysis
The regression models in this analysis were not designed to predict future profit
margin. They were designed to explore significant drivers of historical profit margin. It
becomes harder to find significant variables in a model as more variables are added. One
of the key findings in this model is that the post-2010 samples were significant drivers of
a profit margin. These samples were positively correlated with profit margin which show
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that something happened in the year’s post-2010 where profit margins increased. None
of the economic or environmental variables that were discussed proved to be significant
in the multi-regression model. The absence of these control variables may indicate that
the acquisition changes were internal to the DOD and not the general public.
Using the presented data, there may be evidence to support the Better Buying
Power reform and its impact on improving the acquisition community. Cost growth has
declined between the pre-2011 and post-2010 period and profit margins have increased
over the same periods. However, the sensitivity analysis findings reflect changes
occurring prior to the BBP implementation. This finding makes it difficult to determine
exactly to what degree the observed changes are attributable to BBP.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
The research questions presented in Chapter 1 are reviewed, and interpreted
answers are provided using the results from Chapter 4. Next, limitations in the data and
research methods are discussed. Finally, recommendations for future research are
presented.
Conclusion of Research
The first research question in this analysis examined what trends of profit margin
and cost growth are observed over time. Cost variance and profit margin were plotted as
dependent variables with the period of performance start year as the independent
variable. This resulted in profit margin reflecting a positive correlation with time, such
as, as the years progressed, profit margin increased. Cost variance reflected a negative
correlation. These trends set the framework for the remaining analysis as they are what
we would expect to see if Better Buying Power has been effective.
The research then examined specific trends relative to when BBP was initiated in
2010. First, the research found a statistically significant difference in medians for both
profit margin and cost variance from before 2011 and after 2010. The median profit
margin prior to 2011 was 9.79% and the mean cost variance was 1.14%. For the period
post-2010, the median profit margin increased to 10.91% and the mean cost variance
declined to 0.33%.
In addition, BBP recommended using incentive structured (IF) over award fee
(AF) structured contracts. This report showed that there was an increased usage of
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incentive structures and a reduced use of the award structure. For the incentive structured
samples, profit margin increased from 6.62% before 2011 to 11.10% after 2010.
Likewise, the cost growth for the IF samples declined from 8.77% to -0.65%. The nonparametric Wilcoxon Test confirmed that these differences were statistically significant.
These results may signal that the DoD has embraced the mentality of Chao (2013) who
implied we ought not shy away from profits, but treat them as a rightful reward for
performance. Perhaps the DoD is now willing to pay higher profit in exchange for better
contract performance. In addition, the results may indicate that acquisition professionals
are adhering to recommendations and guidance that Better Buying Power has introduced.
Lastly, the third research question looked to determine the degree in which
observed changes are attributable to the larger economy, program aspects, and overall
policy. Multivariate regression was one tool used to assist in answering this question by
finding a model that best represented the profit data. There were no variables that were
highly predictive of profit margin. The multivariate model was only able to explain 34%
of the variance in the mean profit margin. While the results are naturally tempered by the
inability to include performance into the OLS regression, this result signals that there is
still a large amount of variance to be explained which is logical as there is only so much
that can be controlled through incentives. Importantly, the research found that economic
factors such as unemployment rate, federal funds rate, gross domestic product (GDP),
and the branch of service’s budget were not significant predictors of profit margin. This
suggests that the underlying reason for the observed trends may be internal to the DoD
through technical differences in programs or management of programs. In addition, there
was little evidence to support that the changes being observed were due to the overall
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acquisition environment. The environmental variables were exploratory and found no
significant results. This does not convey that the environment has not had an impact but
simply means additional exploration may be necessary.
Cost growth is believed to be a major predictor of profit margin. However,
performance, in the form of cost growth, was one variable that was not able to be tested
as an independent variable with profit margin as a dependent variable. Therefore,
contingency tables were used to show a dependent relationship between profit margin and
cost variance where profit margin increases as cost variance declines and vice versa.
A central question of the research was to determine how (if at all) Better Buying
Power had impacted the DoD acquisition community. It is more difficult to determine,
however, if the changes observed may be traced specifically to the implementation of
BBP. This study found the trends to have begun before 2010 as seen through the
sensitivity analysis which produced statistically significant differences when using other
years.
The study has, nonetheless, identified a pattern which should give some faith that
the environment set by a series of acquisition reforms has improved its management of
cost. There has been a marked reduction in cost overruns in recent years. This study’s
preliminary analysis of economic variables found no dramatic changes attributable to the
economy which seems to indicate changes are due to contractor performance.
Limitations
The current research had a few significant limitations. First, the dataset used in
this analysis was a combination of two different data sources. Profit data was pulled
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from Cost Data Summary Reports (CDSR) and performance data from Earned Value
Management (EVM) reports. Not all projects require EVM reporting. Therefore, there
were significantly more CDSR reports available than there were EVM reports. Each of
these reports have their owned intended purposes and are not designed to be easily
compared with each other. As such, linking CDSR samples to EVM samples was a
complicated process. Second, one of the unique aspects of this research was analyzing
profit and performance. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, these two variables were
not able to be analyzed using regression. Consequently, other predictors of profit margin
were explored using statistical analysis. Lastly, the current research was focused on the
changes that occurred before and after Better Buying Power was initiated. Most projects
in the database have periods of performance that are several years in length. Therefore,
the sample size of the analysis was limited as many projects starting after 2014 are still in
progress.
Recommendations for Future Research
There is ample opportunity for future research on topics similar to those presented
in the current research. The current study has shown a marked uptick in the use of
incentive contracts, but such growth cannot continue indefinitely. It will be interesting to
see how cost performance changes with an expanded time frame, and once an equilibrium
or new norm is established. While this study finds the new trends encouraging, it is
possible that the momentum toward incentive contracts goes too far, pushing into
contract areas where it is ill-suited. In many ways, the current study was an early look at
a dynamic that yet to full play out. First, as time progresses, there should be more data
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available to compare pre-2011 and post-2010. In addition, the effect of the other Better
Buying Power initiatives in 2012 and 2015 could also be examined. This analysis could
introduce contractor performance ratings from the Contractor Performance Assessment
Reporting System (CPARS) to create a more robust analysis. Second, further research
could also be done on profit margin in the form examining specific contract profits and
contractual profit share ratios. Lastly, the environment of the DoD acquisition
community has much to explore. Training initiatives and certification requirements have
changed drastically in the past decade. Research on the effect of this training and
certification requirement could be accomplished to determine if positive changes in
recent years are attributable to the workforce becoming better at their jobs.
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Appendix
Appendix A – Blank CDSR
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Appendix B - Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR) Requirements

Source: DoDI 5000.02
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Appendix C - EVM Requirements

Source: DoDI 5000.02
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Appendix D – Commodity Distribution
All Samples
Year < 2011
Year > 2010
Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit %
Aircraft
44
-0.77
12.85
28
0.96
10.90
16
-3.81
16.25
Ship
24
7.29
9.29
16
11.26
5.42
8
-0.64
17.03
11.10
11
-1.01
12.05
11
1.07
10.14
UAV
22
0.03
Electronic/Automated Software
19
6.46
7.88
9
9.75
5.38
10
3.50
10.14
Missiles
12
8.14
7.61
8
9.87
6.58
4
4.69
9.66
Space
5
0.51
11.52
3
1.53
12.66
2
-1.04
9.79
1
-2.33
12.38
1
4.15
0.91
7.18
1.99
Ordinance
2
Surface Vehicle
2
2.47
9.13
2
2.47
9.13
0
0.00
0.00
Commodity

Appendix E – Branch of Service Distribution
Year < 2011
Year > 2010
All Samples
Service Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit %
13.49
7.99
27
1.10
7.07
10.00
47
74
4.89
Navy
14.96
13
-5.17
0.94
10.78
12.59
17
Air Force
30
-1.71
9.19
9.42
10
2.77
0.03
1.34
9.31
11
Army
21
5.74
9.35
10.52
2
7.12
5
6.56
10.05
3
DoD (Joint)

Appendix F – Contractor Distribution
Contractor
Contractor A
Contractor B
Contractor C
Contractor D
Contractor E
Contractor F
Contractor G
Contractor H
Contractor I
Contractor J
Contractor K
Contractor L
Contractor M
Contractor N
Contractor O
Contractor P
Contractor Q
Contractor R
Contractor S

All Samples
Pre-2011
Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number
20
1.06
10.62
14
1.75
10.61
6
19
-2.77
13.99
10
-0.05
11.72
9
14
3.31
8.68
9
5.92
7.79
5
13
1.51
10.31
9
0.08
10.33
4
12
0.22
13.91
8
3.17
11.09
4
10
-0.56
11.13
3
-7.48
14.02
7
9
0.89
12.96
7
1.69
11.09
2
6
13.82
-1.22
6
13.82
-1.22
0
5
15.56
8.60
2
33.19
-1.79
3
5
6.56
10.05
3
7.12
10.52
2
3
15.19
9.64
1
18.35
2.89
2
3
14.33
6.80
1
40.16
2.66
2
2
24.54
1.57
2
24.54
1.57
0
2
9.62
9.97
0
0.00
0.00
2
2
-7.00
17.15
0
0.00
0.00
2
2
-0.52
7.35
2
-0.52
7.35
0
1
-4.52
8.45
0
0.00
0.00
1
1
0.03
12.84
1
0.03
12.84
0
1
1.12
6.46
0
0.00
0.00
1
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Post-2010
Mean CV% Mean Profit %
-0.55
10.63
-5.80
16.51
-1.38
10.27
4.73
10.27
-5.69
19.57
2.40
9.88
-1.93
19.53
0.00
0.00
3.80
15.52
5.74
9.35
13.61
13.01
1.41
8.87
0.00
0.00
9.62
9.97
-7.00
17.15
0.00
0.00
-4.52
8.45
0.00
0.00
1.12
6.46

Appendix G – Profit Structure Distribution
Year < 2011
Year > 2010
All Samples
Profit Structure Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit %
IF
72
4.21
10.57
35
9.30
7.19
37
-0.60
13.77
AF
22
1.37
9.73
20
0.95
9.71
2
5.61
10.00
Neither
28
0.18
10.83
17
0.24
10.70
11
0.09
11.03
Both
8
4.12
10.65
6
3.58
11.08
2
5.74
9.35

Appendix H – Contract Type Distribution
Contract Type
Cost
Fixed
MC

All Samples
Year < 2011
Year > 2010
Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit %
72
3.03
9.53
49
3.14
9.82
23
2.78
8.92
51
3.30
11.79
27
7.68
7.29
24
-1.63
16.84
7
-2.14
10.90
2
4.23
8.04
5
-4.68
12.04

Appendix I – Life Cycle Phase Distribution

Prod
Dev

Phase

All Samples
Year < 2011
Year > 2010
Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit % Number Mean CV% Mean Profit %
73
2.37
10.87
42
3.55
9.80
31
0.77
12.30
57
3.48
10.01
36
6.13
7.84
21
-1.06
13.72
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